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Synthese

, Volume 192, Issue 1, pp 67–78 | Cite as

Disagreement, peerhood, and three paradoxes of Conciliationism

  • Thomas MulliganEmail author
Article

Abstract

Conciliatory theories of disagreement require that one lower one’s confidence in a belief in the face of disagreement from an epistemic peer. One question about which people might disagree is who should qualify as an epistemic peer and who should not. But when putative epistemic peers disagree about epistemic peerhood itself, then Conciliationism makes contradictory demands and paradoxes arise.

Keywords

Disagreement Epistemic peer Paradox Conciliationism  Self-defeating arguments 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I am indebted to Bruce Brower, who, in the autumn of 2013, led the Tulane seminar on disagreement in which these ideas first took shape, and who weighed in on earlier drafts of this paper. I also thank Nathan Biebel and Jesse Hill for their thoughtful criticisms, and three anonymous reviewers, each of whom provided helpful comments which improved this work. I also wish to acknowledge, with gratitude, financial support provided by the Edward Marshall Ballard Memorial Fund and Tulane’s School of Liberal Arts.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTulane UniversityNew OrleansUSA

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