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Synthese

, Volume 192, Issue 11, pp 3425–3442 | Cite as

The Shaky Game +25, or: on locavoracity

  • Laura RuetscheEmail author
Article

Abstract

Taking Arthur Fine’s The Shaky Game as my inspiration, and the recent 25\({\textit{th}}\) anniversary of the publication of that work as the occasion to exercise that inspiration, I sketch an alternative to the “Naturalism” prevalent among philosophers of physics. Naturalism is a methodology eventuating in a metaphysics. The methodology is to seek the deep framework assumptions that make the best sense of science; the metaphysics is furnished by those assumptions and supported by their own support of science. The alternative presented here, which I call “Locavoracity,” shares Naturalism’s commitment to making sense of science, but alters Naturalism’s methodology. The Locavore’s sense-making projects are piecemeal, rather than sweeping. The Locavore’s hypothesis is that the collection of local sense-making projects fails to issue a single overarching unifying framework deserving of the title “the metaphysics that makes the best sense of science.” I muster some examples supporting the Locavore hypothesis from the interpretation of quantum field theories.

Keywords

Quantum Gravity Physical Theory Curve Spacetime Scientific Realism Loop Quantum Gravity 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

This piece was instigated by the 2012 Pacific APA symposium “The Shaky Game at 25,” and impelled by the Ontology and Methodology conference at Virginia Tech the following May. I want to thank organizers of and participants in both events—particularly Arthur Fine, Phil Erlich, Ben Jantzen, Deborah Mayo, and Lydia Patton—for their support, feedback, and patience. I also want to thank two anonymous and helpful referees.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MichiganAnn ArborUSA

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