I argue that if we make explicit the role of the user of scientific representations not only in the application but also in the construction of a model or representation, then inconsistent modeling assumptions do not pose an insurmountable obstacle to our representational practices.
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Research for this paper was conducted partly while I had a fellowship for experienced researchers by the Alexander-von-Humboldt Foundation at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in Munich. I would like to thank C. Ulises Moulines and Wolfgang Pietsch for helpful discussions. I also want to thank Paul Teller and Peter Vickers for detailed comments on drafts of this paper.
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Frisch, M. Models and scientific representations or: who is afraid of inconsistency?. Synthese 191, 3027–3040 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0471-9
- Classical electrodynamics