, Volume 191, Issue 15, pp 3541–3556 | Cite as

Epistemic contextualism can be stated properly

  • Alexander Dinges


It has been argued that epistemic contextualism faces the so-called factivity problem and hence cannot be stated properly. The basic idea behind this charge is that contextualists supposedly have to say, on the one hand, that knowledge ascribing sentences like “S knows that S has hands” are true when used in ordinary contexts while, on the other hand, they are not true by the standard of their own context. In my paper, I want to show that the argument to the factivity problem fails because it rests on the mistaken premise that contextualists are committed to the truth of particular ordinary knowledge attributions.


Factivity problem Knowledge norm of assertion  Epistemic contextualism Knowability problem 



Thanks to Elke Brendel, Christoph Jäger, Geert Keil, Crispin Wright, Julia Zakkou and the participants of the EJK Seminar at Arché (St Andrews, 2013), Tobias Rosefeldt’s Lehrstuhlkolloquium (Berlin, 2013), the LOGOS Seminar and GRG (Barcelona, 2011) and Geert Keil’s Lehrstuhlkolloquium (Berlin, 2011). Thanks also to two anonymous referees for this journal. Very special thanks to Dan López de Sa for invaluable discussion at every stage of the development of this paper.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute for PhilosophyHumboldt University of BerlinBerlinGermany

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