Synthese

, Volume 192, Issue 9, pp 2701–2724 | Cite as

Four challenges to the a priori—a posteriori distinction

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Abstract

During the past decade a new twist in the debate regarding the a priori has unfolded. A number of prominent epistemologists have challenged the coherence or importance of the a priori—a posteriori distinction or, alternatively, of the concept of a priori knowledge. My focus in this paper is on these new challenges to the a priori. My goals are to (1) provide a framework for organizing the challenges, (2) articulate and assess a range of the challenges, and (3) present two challenges of my own.

Keywords

A priori A posteriori Challenges Significance Concept Distinction 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of NebraskaLincolnUSA

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