Synthese

, Volume 191, Issue 1, pp 3–15 | Cite as

Experts in science: a view from the trenches

Article

Abstract

In this paper I analyze four so-called “principles of expertise”; that is, good epistemic practices that are normatively motivated by the epistemological literature on expert judgment. I highlight some of the problems that the four principles of expertise run into, when we try to implement them in concrete contexts of application (e.g. in science committees). I suggest some possible alternatives and adjustments to the principles, arguing in general that the epistemology of expertise should be informed both by case studies and by the literature on the use of experts in science practice.

Keywords

Epistemology of expertise Experts Principles of expertise  Social epistemology Science practice 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Finnish Centre of Excellence in the Philosophy of the Social SciencesUniversity of Helsinki HelsinkiFinland

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