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Simultaneous belief updates via successive Jeffrey conditionalization

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Abstract

This paper discusses simultaneous belief updates. I argue here that modeling such belief updates using the Principle of Minimum Information can be regarded as applying Jeffrey conditionalization successively, and so that, contrary to what many probabilists have thought, the simultaneous belief updates can be successfully modeled by means of Jeffrey conditionalization.

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Author information

Correspondence to Ilho Park.

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Park, I. Simultaneous belief updates via successive Jeffrey conditionalization. Synthese 190, 3511–3533 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0207-7

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Keywords

  • Jeffrey conditionalization
  • Simultaneous belief updates
  • Principle of minimum information