Synthese

, Volume 190, Issue 4, pp 693–707 | Cite as

Modal property comprehension

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Abstract

To define new property terms, we combine already familiar predicates by means of certain logical operations. Given suitable constraints, these operations may presumably include truth-functional sentence connectives and quantification over objects. What is less clear is whether we can also use modal operators for this purpose. The aim of this paper is to clarify what is involved in this question, and to argue in favor of modal property definitions.

Keywords

Property definitions Modal properties Dispositions Causal bases Aboutness 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentColgate UniversityHamiltonUSA

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