Synthese

, Volume 189, Issue 2, pp 221–234 | Cite as

Introduction

  • Annalisa Coliva
  • Sebastiano Moruzzi
  • Giorgio Volpe
Article

Abstract

This Introduction to the special issue on “Skepticism and Justification” provides a background to the nine articles collected here and a detailed summary of each, which highlights their interconnections and relevance to the debate at the heart of the issue.

Keywords

Justification Knowledge Evidentialism Skeptical arguments Principle of closure Transmission failure Easy knowledge Bootstrapping arguments Norms of assertion 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Annalisa Coliva
    • 1
  • Sebastiano Moruzzi
    • 2
  • Giorgio Volpe
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Linguistic and Cultural StudiesUniversity of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Associate Director of COGITO Research Centre (Bologna)ModenaItaly
  2. 2.Department of Philosophy and CommunicationUniversity of Bologna, Member of COGITO Research Centre (Bologna)BolognaItaly
  3. 3.Department of Philosophy and CommunicationUniversity of Bologna, Member of COGITO Research Centre (Bologna)BolognaItaly

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