, Volume 190, Issue 16, pp 3377–3395 | Cite as

Variations on a Montagovian theme

  • Wolfgang SchwarzEmail author


What are the objects of knowledge, belief, probability, apriority or analyticity? For at least some of these properties, it seems plausible that the objects are sentences, or sentence-like entities. However, results from mathematical logic indicate that sentential properties are subject to severe formal limitations. After surveying these results, I argue that they are more problematic than often assumed, that they can be avoided by taking the objects of the relevant property to be coarse-grained (“sets of worlds”) propositions, and that all this has little to do with the choice between operators and predicates.


Propositions Propositional attitudes Objects of attitudes Montague Thomason Knower paradox Diagonalisation 


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.RSSS School of PhilosophyANUCanberraAustralia

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