, Volume 190, Issue 15, pp 3149–3160

A puzzle about belief updating

Open Access

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-012-0132-9

Cite this article as:
Martini, C. Synthese (2013) 190: 3149. doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0132-9


In recent decades much literature has been produced on disagreement; the puzzling conclusion being that epistemic disagreement is, for the most part, either impossible (e.g. Aumann (Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239, 1976)), or at least easily resolvable (e.g. Elga (Noûs 41(3):478–502, 2007)). In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, an equally puzzling result arises: that is, disagreement cannot be rationally resolved by belief updating. I suggest a solution to the puzzle which makes use of some of the principles of Hintikka’s Socratic epistemology.


Disagreement Consensus Epistemology of disagreement Belief updating Linear updating Equal weight view Socratic epistemology 

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy & EconomicsUniversity of BayreuthBayreuthGermany

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