Synthese

, Volume 191, Issue 9, pp 2029–2045 | Cite as

Partiality and prejudice in trusting

Article

Abstract

You can trust your friends. You should trust your friends. Not all of your friends all of the time: you can reasonably trust different friends to different degrees, and in different domains. Still, we often trust our friends, and it is often reasonable to do so. Why is this? In this paper I explore how and whether friendship gives us reasons to trust our friends, reasons which may outstrip or conflict with our epistemic reasons. In the final section, I will sketch some related questions concerning trust based on the trustee’s race, gender, or other social identity.

Keywords

Trust Distrust Friendship Partiality Belief Forbidden base rates Epistemic injustice 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of St AndrewsSt AndrewsScotland

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