Synthese

, Volume 190, Issue 1, pp 171–185 | Cite as

Proper bootstrapping

Open Access
Article

Abstract

According to a much discussed argument, reliabilism is defective for making knowledge too easy to come by. In a recent paper, Weisberg aims to show that this argument relies on a type of reasoning that is rejectable on independent grounds. We argue that the blanket rejection that Weisberg recommends of this type of reasoning is both unwarranted and unwelcome. Drawing on an older discussion in the philosophy of science, we show that placing some relatively modest restrictions on the said type of reasoning suffices to block the anti-reliabilist argument.

Keywords

Confirmation theory Bootstrapping Easy knowledge 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Thanks are due to Jonathan Adler, Christopher von Bülow, and the participants at a meeting of the European Epistemology Network in Brussels for very helpful comments on ancestors of this paper.

Open Access

This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of PhilosophyUniversity of GroningenGroningenThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Institute of PhilosophyUniversity of LeuvenLeuvenBelgium

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