Synthese

, Volume 190, Issue 14, pp 2853–2866 | Cite as

Correlations, deviations and expectations: the Extended Principle of the Common Cause

Article

Abstract

The Principle of the Common Cause is usually understood to provide causal explanations for probabilistic correlations obtaining between causally unrelated events. In this study, an extended interpretation of the principle is proposed, according to which common causes should be invoked to explain positive correlations whose values depart from the ones that one would expect to obtain in accordance to her probabilistic expectations. In addition, a probabilistic model for common causes is tailored which satisfies the generalized version of the principle, at the same time including the standard conjunctive-fork model as a special case.

Keywords

Principle of the Common Cause Correlation Deviation Expectation Explanation 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Historical and Philosophical InquiryThe University of SydneySydneyAustralia

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