, Volume 190, Issue 14, pp 2835–2851

Concessive knowledge-attributions: fallibilism and gradualism



Any knowledge-fallibilist needs to solve the conceptual problem posed by concessive knowledge-attributions (such as ‘I know that p, but possibly not-p’). These seem to challenge the coherence of knowledge-fallibilism. This paper defuses that challenge via a gradualist refinement of what Fantl and McGrath (2009) call weak epistemic fallibilism.


Fallibilism Knowledge Concessive knowledge-attribution Jeremy Fantl Matthew McGrath Gradualism 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of New South WalesSydneyAustralia

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