Synthese

, Volume 189, Supplement 1, pp 119–130 | Cite as

Associations between psychologists’ thinking styles and accuracy on a diagnostic classification task

  • Alexander A. Aarts
  • Cilia L. M. Witteman
  • Pierre M. Souren
  • Jos I. M. Egger
Open Access
Article

Abstract

The present study investigated whether individual differences between psychologists in thinking styles are associated with accuracy in diagnostic classification. We asked novice and experienced clinicians to classify two clinical cases of clients with two co-occurring psychological disorders. No significant difference in diagnostic accuracy was found between the two groups, but when combining the data from novices and experienced psychologists accuracy was found to be negatively associated with certain decision making strategies and with a higher self-assessed ability and preference for a rational thinking style. Our results underscore the idea that it might be fruitful to look for explanations of differences in the accuracy of diagnostic judgments in individual differences between psychologists (such as in thinking styles or decision making strategies used), rather than in experience level.

Keywords

Diagnostic classification Thinking style Decision making 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alexander A. Aarts
    • 1
  • Cilia L. M. Witteman
    • 1
  • Pierre M. Souren
    • 1
  • Jos I. M. Egger
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.Behavioural Science InstituteRadboud University NijmegenNijmegenThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Centre of Excellence for NeuropsychiatryVincent van Gogh Institute for PsychiatryVenrayThe Netherlands
  3. 3.Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Centre for CognitionRadboud University NijmegenNijmegenThe Netherlands

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