, Volume 190, Issue 12, pp 2413–2427

A Truthmaker Indispensability Argument


DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-9989-2

Cite this article as:
Baron, S. Synthese (2013) 190: 2413. doi:10.1007/s11229-011-9989-2


Recently, nominalists have made a case against the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism by taking issue with Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. In this paper I propose and defend an indispensability argument founded on an alternative criterion of ontological commitment: that advocated by David Armstrong. By defending such an argument I place the burden back onto the nominalist to defend her favourite criterion of ontological commitment and, furthermore, show that criterion cannot be used to formulate a plausible form of the indispensability argument.


Indispensability Ontological commitment Platonism Nominalism Truthmakers 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Philosophical and Historical EnquiryUniversity of SydneySydneyAustralia

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