, Volume 185, Supplement 1, pp 1–17

DΔL: a dynamic deontic logic



This paper suggests that it should be possible to develop dynamic deontic logic as a counterpart to the very successful development of dynamic doxastic logic (or dynamic epistemic logic, as it is more often called). The ambition, arrived at towards the end of the paper, is to give formal representations of agentive concepts such as “the agent is about to do (has just done) α” as well as of deontic concepts such as “it is obligatory (permissible, forbidden) for the agent to do α”, where α stands for an action (event).


Actions Norms The logic of “obligatory”, “permitted” and “forbidden” 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Uppsala UniversityUppsalaSweden

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