, Volume 188, Issue 2, pp 217–230 | Cite as

The Gettier-illusion: Gettier-partialism and infallibilism



Could the standard interpretation of Gettier cases reflect a fundamental confusion? Indeed so. How well can epistemologists argue for the truth of that standard interpretation? Not so well. A methodological mistake is allowing them not to notice how they are simply (and inappropriately) being infallibilists when regarding Gettiered beliefs as failing to be knowledge. There is no Gettier problem that we have not merely created for ourselves by unwittingly being infallibilists about knowledge.


Gettier cases Knowledge Safety Gettier Duncan Pritchard Justified true belief Infallibilism 


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of New South WalesSydneyAustralia

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