, Volume 188, Issue 2, pp 165–177 | Cite as

On “Epistemic Permissiveness”



In “Epistemic Permissiveness”, Roger White presents several arguments against Extreme Permissivism, the view that there are possible cases where, given one’s total evidence, it would be rational to either believe P, or to believe ∼P. In this paper, we carefully reconstruct White’s arguments and then argue that they do not succeed.


Epistemology Rationality Permissiveness Uniqueness Roger White 


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  4. White R. (2005) Epistemic permissiveness. Philosophical Issues 15: 445–459Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of CaliforniaSanta BarbaraUSA

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