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Belief control and intentionality

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that the rejection of doxastic voluntarism is not as straightforward as its opponents take it to be. I begin with a critical examination of William Alston’s defense of involuntarism and then focus on the question of whether belief is intentional.

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References

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Correspondence to Matthias Steup.

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Steup, M. Belief control and intentionality. Synthese 188, 145–163 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9919-3

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Keywords

  • Belief
  • Compatibilism
  • Deciding to believe
  • Doxastic attitudes
  • Doxastic voluntarism
  • Intentionality
  • Libertarianism
  • Volitions
  • Voluntary control