, Volume 188, Issue 2, pp 145–163 | Cite as

Belief control and intentionality



In this paper, I argue that the rejection of doxastic voluntarism is not as straightforward as its opponents take it to be. I begin with a critical examination of William Alston’s defense of involuntarism and then focus on the question of whether belief is intentional.


Belief Compatibilism Deciding to believe Doxastic attitudes Doxastic voluntarism Intentionality Libertarianism Volitions Voluntary control 


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Purdue UniversityWest LafayetteUSA

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