Synthese

, Volume 187, Issue 3, pp 833–847 | Cite as

Multitude, tolerance and language-transcendence

Article

Abstract

Rudolf Carnap’s 1930s philosophy of logic, including his adherence to the principle of tolerance, is discussed. What theses did Carnap commit himself to, exactly? I argue that while Carnap did commit himself to a certain multitude thesis—there are different logics of different languages, and the choice between these languages is merely a matter of expediency—there is no evidence that he rejected a language-transcendent notion of fact, contrary to what Warren Goldfarb and Thomas Ricketts have prominently argued. (In fact, it is obscure just what Goldfarb and Ricketts claim about Carnap.) Toward the end I critically discuss Michael Friedman’s suggestion that Carnap believed in a relative a priori.

Keywords

Rudolf Carnap Multitude Tolerance Conventionalism Language-transcendence A priori Kurt Gödel Warren Goldfarb Thomas Ricketts Michael Friedman 

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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Cornell UniversityIthacaUSA

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