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Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches

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Abstract

We sketch a framework for building a unified science of cognition. This unification is achieved by showing how functional analyses of cognitive capacities can be integrated with the multilevel mechanistic explanations of neural systems. The core idea is that functional analyses are sketches of mechanisms, in which some structural aspects of a mechanistic explanation are omitted. Once the missing aspects are filled in, a functional analysis turns into a full-blown mechanistic explanation. By this process, functional analyses are seamlessly integrated with multilevel mechanistic explanations.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Missouri, St. Louis, MO, USA

    Gualtiero Piccinini

  2. Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA

    Carl Craver

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  1. Gualtiero Piccinini
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  2. Carl Craver
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Correspondence to Gualtiero Piccinini.

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Piccinini, G., Craver, C. Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches. Synthese 183, 283–311 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9898-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9898-4

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