, Volume 187, Issue 1, pp 179–207

The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review


DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-0025-3

Cite this article as:
List, C. Synthese (2012) 187: 179. doi:10.1007/s11229-011-0025-3


This paper provides an introductory review of the theory of judgment aggregation. It introduces the paradoxes of majority voting that originally motivated the field, explains several key results on the impossibility of propositionwise judgment aggregation, presents a pedagogical proof of one of those results, discusses escape routes from the impossibility and relates judgment aggregation to some other salient aggregation problems, such as preference aggregation, abstract aggregation and probability aggregation. The present illustrative rather than exhaustive review is intended to give readers who are new to the field of judgment aggregation a sense of this rapidly growing research area.


Judgment aggregation Discursive dilemma Condorcet’s paradox Arrow’s impossibility theorem Social choice theory Democracy 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departments of Government and PhilosophyLondon School of EconomicsLondonUK

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