, Volume 187, Issue 2, pp 693–713 | Cite as

Theory structuralism in a rigid framework



This paper develops the first parts of a logical framework for the empirical sciences, by means of a redefinition of theory structuralism as originally developed by Joseph Sneed, Wolfgang Stegmüller, and others, in the context of a ‘rigid’ logic as based on a fixed (therefore rigid) ontology. The paper defends a formal conception of the empirical sciences that has an irreducible ontological basis and is unable, in general, to provide purely structural characterizations of the domain of a theory. The extreme rationalist utopia of a characterization of the real world ‘up to isomorphism’, therefore, is rejected.


Formal frameworks for the empirical sciences Theory structuralism Semi-interpreted languages Rigid logic Joseph Sneed Wolfgang Stegmüller 


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute Vienna Circlec/o University of ViennaViennaAustria

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