, Volume 190, Issue 1, pp 129–138

Contrastive confirmation: some competing accounts



I outline four competing probabilistic accounts of contrastive evidential support and consider various considerations that might help arbitrate between these. The upshot of the discussion is that the so-called ‘Law of Likelihood’ is to be preferred to any of the alternatives considered.


Law of Likelihood Contrastive confirmation Bayesianism Probability 


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center for Logic and Analytic Philosophy, HIW, KU LeuvenLeuvenBelgium

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