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Synthese

, Volume 183, Issue 2, pp 143–160 | Cite as

Indexicals, context-sensitivity and the failure of implication

  • Gillian RussellEmail author
Article
  • 197 Downloads

Abstract

This paper investigates, formulates and proves an indexical barrier theorem, according to which sets of non-indexical sentences do not entail (except under specified special circumstances) indexical sentences. It surveys the usual difficulties for this kind of project, as well some that are specific to the case of indexicals, and adapts the strategy of Restall and Russell’s “Barriers to Implication” to overcome these. At the end of the paper a reverse barrier theorem is also proved, according to which an indexical sentence will not, except under specified circumstances, entail a non-indexical one.

Keywords

Indexical Context-sensitive Language Logic Implication barrier theorem 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Washington University in St. LouisSt. LouisUSA

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