, Volume 182, Issue 3, pp 393–411 | Cite as

Self-location is no problem for conditionalization

  • D. J. Bradley


How do temporal and eternal beliefs interact? I argue that acquiring a temporal belief should have no effect on eternal beliefs for an important range of cases. Thus, I oppose the popular view that new norms of belief change must be introduced for cases where the only change is the passing of time. I defend this position from the purported counter-examples of the Prisoner and Sleeping Beauty. I distinguish two importantly different ways in which temporal beliefs can be acquired and draw some general conclusions about their impact on eternal beliefs.


Sleeping Beauty Self-location Conditionalization The Prisoner 


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The City College of New YorkNew YorkUSA

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