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Synthese

, Volume 173, Issue 2, pp 123–126 | Cite as

Advances in belief dynamics: Introduction

  • F. LiuEmail author
  • O. Roy
Open Access
Article

Notes

Acknowledgements

The editors would like to thank the participants to the workshop “GLLC XV: The Dynamics of Preferences and Intentions,” from which stem most contributions to this special issue. Financial support from the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO), grant #2008/00804/EW, is gratefully acknowledged.

Open Access

This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.

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© The Author(s) 2010

Open AccessThis is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTsinghua UniversityBeijingChina
  2. 2.Faculty of PhilosophyUniversity of GroningenGroningenThe Netherlands

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