In defense of true higher-order vagueness
- 168 Downloads
Stewart Shapiro recently argued that there is no higher-order vagueness. More specifically, his thesis is: (ST) ‘So-called second-order vagueness in ‘F’ is nothing but first-order vagueness in the phrase ‘competent speaker of English’ or ‘competent user of “F”’. Shapiro bases (ST) on a description of the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness and two accounts of ‘borderline case’ and provides several arguments in its support. We present the phenomenon (as Shapiro describes it) and the accounts; then discuss Shapiro’s arguments, arguing that none is compelling. Lastly, we introduce the account of vagueness Shapiro would have obtained had he retained compositionality and show that it entails true higher-order.
KeywordsVagueness Higher-order vagueness Contextualism Qualified individuals
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Bobzien, S. (2010). If it’s clear, then it’s clear that it’s clear, or is it? - Higher-order vagueness and the S4 Axiom. In K. Ierodiakonou (Ed.), Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes. Oxford: OUP (forthcoming).Google Scholar
- Eklund, M. (2006). Review of vagueness in context. Notre Dame Philosophy Reviews. http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=6624.
- Fine, K. (1975). Vagueness, truth and logic. Synthèse, 30, 265–300. (Reprinted in Vagueness: A reader, by R. Keefe & P. Smith, Eds., 1997, Cambridge: CUP).Google Scholar
- Glanzberg M. (2003) Against truth-value gaps. In: Beall J. (eds) Liars and heaps. OUP, Oxford, pp 151–194Google Scholar
- Greenough, P. (2005). Higher-order vagueness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 105(Suppl), 167–190.Google Scholar
- Keefe R. (2000) Theories of vagueness. CUP, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
- Shapiro, S. (2005). Context, conversation, and so-called “higher-order” vagueness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 105(Suppl), 147–165.Google Scholar