Synthese

, Volume 179, Issue 3, pp 409–433

In defence of virtue epistemology

Article

Abstract

In a number of recent papers Duncan Pritchard argues that virtue epistemology’s central ability condition—one knows that p if and only if one has attained cognitive success (true belief) because of the exercise of intellectual ability—is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. This paper discusses and dismisses a number of responses to Pritchard’s objections and develops a new way of defending virtue epistemology against them.

Keywords

Knowledge Achievement Virtue epistemology Pritchard 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of LeuvenLeuvenBelgium

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