Synthese

, 171:291 | Cite as

A dynamic-epistemic hybrid logic for intentions and information changes in strategic games

Open Access
Article

Abstract

In this paper I present a dynamic-epistemic hybrid logic for reasoning about information and intention changes in situations of strategic interaction. I provide a complete axiomatization for this logic, and then use it to study intentions-based transformations of decision problems.

Keywords

Intentions Rationality Interaction Transformation of decision problems Fixed points 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of PhilosophyUniversity of GroningenGroningenThe Netherlands

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