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Synthese

, Volume 177, Issue 1, pp 139–149 | Cite as

Corroboration and auxiliary hypotheses: Duhem’s thesis revisited

  • Darrell P. RowbottomEmail author
Article

Abstract

This paper argues that Duhem’s thesis does not decisively refute a corroboration-based account of scientific methodology (or ‘falsificationism’), but instead that auxiliary hypotheses are themselves subject to measurements of corroboration which can be used to inform practice. It argues that a corroboration-based account is equal to the popular Bayesian alternative, which has received much more recent attention, in this respect.

Keywords

Corroboration Falsificationism Duhem’s thesis Quine–Duhem thesis Confirmation Popper 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of OxfordOxfordUK

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