, Volume 182, Issue 1, pp 101–116 | Cite as

From data to phenomena: a Kantian stance



This paper investigates some metaphysical and epistemological assumptions behind Bogen and Woodward’s data-to-phenomena inferences. I raise a series of points and suggest an alternative possible Kantian stance about data-to-phenomena inferences. I clarify the nature of the suggested Kantian stance by contrasting it with McAllister’s view about phenomena as patterns in data sets.


Data Phenomena Bogen Woodward McAllister Kant 


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Science and Technology StudiesUniversity College LondonLondonUK

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