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Synthese

, Volume 170, Issue 2, pp 275–287 | Cite as

Keep making sense

  • Gabriel SegalEmail author
Article
  • 112 Downloads

Abstract

In a number works Jerry Fodor has defended a reductive, causal and referential theory of cognitive content. I argue against this, defending a quasi-Fregean notion of cognitive content, and arguing also that the cognitive content of non-singular concepts is narrow, rather than wide.

Keywords

Intentionality Reductionism Sense Reference Narrow content 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.LondonUK

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