Synthese

, Volume 170, Issue 2, pp 235–250 | Cite as

LOT, CTM, and the Elephant in the Room

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Abstract

According to the language of thought (LOT) approach and the related computational theory of mind (CTM), thinking is the processing of symbols in an inner mental language that is distinct from any public language. Herein, I explore a deep problem at the heart of the LOT/CTM program—it has yet to provide a plausible conception of a mental symbol.

Keywords

Language of thought Computational theory of mind Symbol Connectionism Fodor Symbol processing 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience and Institute for Research in Cognitive ScienceUniversity of PennsylvaniaPhiladelphiaUSA

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