Synthese

, Volume 176, Issue 3, pp 345–359 | Cite as

Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals: Lewis versus Williamson on modal knowledge

Article

Abstract

The epistemology of modality is gradually coming to play a central role in general discussions about modality. This paper is a contribution in this direction, in particular I draw a comparison between Lewis’s Modal realism and Timothy Williamson’s recent account of modality in terms of counterfactual thinking. In order to have criteria of evaluation, I also formulate four requirements which are supposed to be met by any theory of modality to be epistemologically adequate.

Keywords

Modal epistemology Counterfactual thinking Possible worlds Modality 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of LeedsLeedsUK

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