, Volume 173, Issue 2, pp 199–210 | Cite as

Ranking judgments in Arrow’s setting

  • Daniele PorelloEmail author
Open Access


In this paper, I investigate the relationship between preference and judgment aggregation, using the notion of ranking judgment introduced in List and Pettit (Synthese 140(1–2):207–235, 2004). Ranking judgments were introduced in order to state the logical connections between the impossibility theorem of aggregating sets of judgments proved in List and Pettit (Economics and Philosophy 18:89–110, 2002) and Arrow’s theorem (Arrow, Social choice and individual values, 1963). I present a proof of the theorem concerning ranking judgments as a corollary of Arrow’s theorem, extending the translation between preferences and judgments defined in List and Pettit (Synthese 140(1–2):207–235, 2004) to the conditions on the aggregation procedure.


Arrow’s theorem Conodorcet’s paradox Discursive dilemma Aggregation of ranking judgments First order logic 



I wish to thank Valeria Ottonelli for the invaluable discussions. I also thank an anonymous referee for the very helpful comments on notation.

Open Access

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC)University of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands

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