Synthese

, 172:215

Scientific models and fictional objects

Article

Abstract

In this paper, I distinguish scientific models in three kinds on the basis of their ontological status—material models, mathematical models and fictional models, and develop and defend an account of fictional models as fictional objects—i.e. abstract objects that stand for possible concrete objects.

Keywords

Scientific models Fictional objects 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyCarleton UniversityOttawaCanada

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