, Volume 168, Issue 2, pp 295–312 | Cite as

Sleeping Beauty and shifted Jeffrey conditionalization

  • Namjoong Kim


In this paper, I argue for a view largely favorable to the Thirder view: when Sleeping Beauty wakes up on Monday, her credence in the coin’s landing heads is less than 1/2. Let’s call this “the Lesser view.” For my argument, I (i) criticize Strict Conditionalization as the rule for changing de se credences; (ii) develop a new rule; and (iii) defend it by Gaifman’s Expert Principle. Finally, I defend the Lesser view by making use of this new rule.


Sleeping Beauty De se belief Self-locating belief De se credence Updating rule 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of MassachusettsAmherstUSA

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