, Volume 167, Issue 2, pp 231–249 | Cite as

Reasoning about data and information

Abstraction between states and commodities


Cognitive states as well as cognitive commodities play central though distinct roles in our epistemological theories. By being attentive to how a difference in their roles affects our way of referring to them, we can undoubtedly accrue our understanding of the structure and functioning of our main epistemological theories. In this paper we propose an analysis of the dichotomy between states and commodities in terms of the method of abstraction, and more specifically by means of infomorphisms between different ways to classify states of information, information-bases, and evidential situations.


Data Information Information flow Method of abstraction 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Logic and Philosophy of ScienceVrije Universiteit BrusselBrusselsBelgium
  2. 2.IEGOxford UniversityOxfordUK

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