Synthese

, Volume 172, Issue 3, pp 397–414 | Cite as

The importance of belief in argumentation: belief, commitment and the effective resolution of a difference of opinion

Article

Abstract

This paper examines the adequacy of commitment change, as a measure of the successful resolution of a difference of opinion. I argue that differences of opinion are only effectively resolved if commitments undertaken in argumentation survive beyond its conclusion and go on to govern an arguer’s actions in everyday life, e.g., by serving as premises in her practical reasoning. Yet this occurs, I maintain, only when an arguer’s beliefs are changed, not merely her commitments.

Keywords

Acceptance Argumentation Belief Commitment Difference of opinion Resolution of a difference of opinion 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyOld Dominion UniversityNorfolkUSA

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