Synthese

, Volume 170, Issue 1, pp 1–5 | Cite as

Relativizing utterance-truth?

Article

Abstract

In recent years, some people have held that a radical relativist position is defensible in some philosophically interesting cases, including future contingents, predicates of personal taste, evaluative predicates in general, epistemic modals, and knowledge attributions. The position is frequently characterized as denying that utterance-truth is absolute. I argue that this characterization is inappropriate, as it requires a metaphysical substantive contention with which moderate views as such need not be committed. Before this, I also offer a more basic, admittedly less exciting alternative characterization of the position, in terms of departing from the Kaplan–Lewis–Stalnaker two-dimensional framework.

Keywords

Relativism Utterance-truth Utterances Sentence Context Contextualism Two-dimensionalism 

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.ICREA at LOGOSUniversitat de BarcelonaBarcelonaSpain
  2. 2.ArchéUniversity of St AndrewsFifeScotland

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