, Volume 169, Issue 1, pp 51–73 | Cite as

A deflationary theory of reference

  • Arvid BåveEmail author


The article first rehearses three deflationary theories of reference, (1) disquotationalism, (2) propositionalism (Horwich), and (3) the anaphoric theory (Brandom), and raises a number of objections against them. It turns out that each corresponds to a closely related theory of truth, and that these are subject to analogous criticisms to a surprisingly high extent. I then present a theory of my own, according to which the schema “That S(t) is about t” and the biconditional “S refers to x iff S says something about x” are exhaustive of the notions of aboutness and reference. An account of the usefulness of “about” is then given, which, I argue, is superior to that of Horwich. I close with a few considerations about how the advertised theory relates to well-known issues of reference, the conclusions of which is (1) that the issues concern reference and aboutness only insofar as the words “about” and “refer” serve to generalise over the claims that are really at issue, (2) that the theory of reference will not settle the issues, and (3) that it follows from (2) that the issues do not concern the nature of aboutness or reference.


Reference Aboutness Denotation Deflationism Disquotationalism Prosententialism Anaphor Horwich Field Brandom Externalism Empty names Definite descriptions Descriptions Russell 


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Filosofiska institutionenStockholms universitetStockholmSweden

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