, 171:399 | Cite as

On what it is to be in a quandary

  • Patrick GreenoughEmail author


A number of serious problems are raised against Crispin Wright’s quandary conception of vagueness. Two alternative conceptions of the quandary view are proposed instead. The first conception retains Wright’s thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. However a further problem is seen to beset this conception. The second conception, in response to this further problem, does not enjoin the thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. The result is a much simpler and more plausible version of the quandary view.


Vagueness Borderline cases Ignorance Knowability Quandary Assertion Intuitionistic logic 


  1. Greenough P. (2003) Vagueness: A minimal theory. Mind 112: 235–281CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Rosenkranz S. (2003) Wright on vagueness and agnosticism. Mind 112((447): 449–463CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Rosenkranz S. (2005) Knowledge in borderline cases. Analysis 65: 49–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Williamson T. (2000) Knowledge and its limits. Oxford University Press, Oxford/NYGoogle Scholar
  5. Wright C. (1976) Language mastery and the sorites paradox. In: Evans G., McDowell J.(eds) Truth and meaning: Essays in semantics.. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp 223–247Google Scholar
  6. Wright C. (1987) Further reflections on the sorites paradox. Philosophical Topics 15: 227–290Google Scholar
  7. Wright C. (1992) Truth and objectivity. Harvard University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  8. Wright, C. (1995). The epistemic conception of vagueness. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 33, Supplement: In T. Horgan (Ed.), Vagueness (pp. 133–159).Google Scholar
  9. Wright C. (2001) On being in a quandary. Mind 110: 45–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Wright C. (2003) Vagueness: A fifth column approach. In: Beall J.C.(eds) Liars and heaps: New essays on paradox. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 84–105Google Scholar
  11. Wright, C. (2003b). Rosenkranz on quandary, vagueness, and intuitionism. Mind, 112, 447, 465–474.Google Scholar
  12. Wright, C. (forthcoming) On the characterisation of borderline cases. In G. Ostertag (Ed.), Meanings and other things: Essays on Stephen Schiffer. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of St. AndrewsScotlandUK
  2. 2.Philosophy Programme, RSSS, ANUCanberraAustralia

Personalised recommendations