Indeterminacy, identity and counterparts: Evans reconsidered
In this paper I argue that Gareth Evans’ famous proof of the impossibility of de re indeterminate identity fails on a counterpart-theoretic interpretation of the determinacy operators. I attempt to motivate a counterpart-theoretic reading of the determinacy operators and then show that, understood counterpart-theoretically, Evans’ argument is straightforwardly invalid.
KeywordsVague identity Ontic vagueness Indeterminacy Counterpart theory
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