, Volume 168, Issue 1, pp 81–96 | Cite as

Indeterminacy, identity and counterparts: Evans reconsidered



In this paper I argue that Gareth Evans’ famous proof of the impossibility of de re indeterminate identity fails on a counterpart-theoretic interpretation of the determinacy operators. I attempt to motivate a counterpart-theoretic reading of the determinacy operators and then show that, understood counterpart-theoretically, Evans’ argument is straightforwardly invalid.


Vague identity Ontic vagueness Indeterminacy Counterpart theory 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of LeedsLeedsUK

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