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Synthese

, Volume 163, Issue 1, pp 45–77 | Cite as

A logic of intention and attempt

  • Emiliano Lorini
  • Andreas Herzig
Article

Abstract

We present a modal logic called \({\mathcal{LIA}}\) (logic of intention and attempt) in which we can reason about intention dynamics and intentional action execution. By exploiting the expressive power of \({\mathcal{LIA}}\), we provide a formal analysis of the relation between intention and action and highlight the pivotal role of attempt in action execution. Besides, we deal with the problems of instrumental reasoning and intention persistence.

Keywords

Intention Action Logic 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse-IRITToulouse Cedex 7France

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