Synthese

, Volume 166, Issue 2, pp 359–374

Relative truth, speaker commitment, and control of implicit arguments

Article

Abstract

Recent arguments for relativist semantic theories have centered on the phenomenon of “faultless disagreement.” This paper offers independent motivation for such theories, based on the interpretation of predicates of personal taste in certain attitude contexts and presuppositional constructions. It is argued that the correct interpretation falls out naturally from a relativist theory, but requires special stipulation in a theory which appeals instead to the use of hidden indexicals; and that a hidden indexical analysis presents problems for contemporary syntactic theory.

Keywords

Relativism Taste Factives 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of LinguisticsUniversity of IllinoisUrbanaUSA

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