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Synthese

, Volume 166, Issue 2, pp 413–430 | Cite as

A coherent moral relativism

Article

Abstract

Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face.

Keywords

Moral relativism Alethic pluralism Truth Coherence 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of ConnecticutStorrsUSA

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