Synthese

, Volume 159, Issue 3, pp 315–328 | Cite as

Functional integration and the mind

Article

Abstract

Different cognitive functions recruit a number of different, often overlapping, areas of the brain. Theories in cognitive and computational neuroscience are beginning to take this kind of functional integration into account. The contributions to this special issue consider what functional integration tells us about various aspects of the mind such as perception, language, volition, agency, and reward. Here, I consider how and why functional integration may matter for the mind; I discuss a general theoretical framework, based on generative models, that may unify many of the debates surrounding functional integration and the mind; and I briefly introduce each of the contributions.

Keywords

Functional integration Functional segregation Interconnectivity Phenomenology fMRI Generative models Predictive coding 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Bartels A., Zeki S. (2004). The neural correlates of maternal and romantic love. NeuroImage 21(3): 1155–1166CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Damasio A. (1994). Descartes’ Error. NY, Grosset/PutnamGoogle Scholar
  3. Frackowiak R.S. (ed) (2004). Human brain function. London, Academic PressGoogle Scholar
  4. Friston K. (2002). Beyond phrenology: What can neuroimaging tell us about distributed circuitry?. Annual Review of Neuroscience 25(1): 221–250CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Friston K.J. (2005). A theory of cortical responses. Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences 369(1456): 815–836CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Frith C. (2005). The self in action: Lessons from delusions of control. Consciousness and Cognition 14(4): 752CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Gregory R.L. (1980). Perceptions as hypotheses. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B: Biological Sciences 290(1038): 181–197CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Gregory R.L. (1996). What do qualia do. Perception 25(4): 377–379Google Scholar
  9. Gregory R.L. (1997). Knowledge in perception and illusion. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 352(1358): 1121–1127CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Gusnard D.A. (2005). Being a self: Considerations from functional imaging. Consciousness and Cognition 14(4): 679CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Haynes J.D., Deichmann R. et al. (2005). Eye-specific effects of binocular rivalry in the human lateral geniculate nucleus. Nature 438: 496CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Helmholtz H.V. (1860). Treatise on physiological optics. New York, DoverGoogle Scholar
  13. Hohwy, J. (2007). The sense of self in the phenomenology of agency and perception. Psyche, 13(1).Google Scholar
  14. Hohwy, J., Roepstorff, A., & Friston, K. (in prep.). Predictive coding and binocular rivalry.Google Scholar
  15. MacKay, D. M. (1956). The epistemological problem for automata. In C. E. Shannon, & J. McCarthy (Eds.), Automata studies. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 235–251.Google Scholar
  16. Mumford D. (1992). On the computational architecture of the neocortex. Biological Cybernetics 66(3): 241CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Neisser U. (1967). Cognitive psychology. New York, Appleton-Century-CroftsGoogle Scholar
  18. Noë A. (2004). Action in Perception. Cambridge, Mass, MIT PressGoogle Scholar
  19. Pearl J. (2000). Causality. Cambridge, Cambridge University PressGoogle Scholar
  20. Piccinini G. (2006). Computational explanation in neuroscience. Synthese 153(3): 343–353CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Raichle M.E. (2006). The Brain’s Dark Energy. Science 314(5803): 1249–1250CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Raichle M.E., MacLeod A.M. et al. (2001). A default mode of brain function. PNAS 98(2): 676–682CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Tong F., Meng M. et al. (2006). Neural bases of binocular rivalry. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(11): 502CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Uttal W.R. (2001). The New Phrenology. Cambridge: Mass, MIT PressGoogle Scholar
  25. Woodward J. (2003). Making Things Happen. New York, Oxford University PressGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyMonash UniversityClaytonAustralia

Personalised recommendations